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This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Peacekeeping on 21 August 2018, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2018.1511374 . ; Contrary to most debates about state formation, this article outlines an alternative perspective on the shaping of political community – and the international peace architecture – based on the agency of actors engaged in peaceful forms of politics after war. Drawing on long-standing critical debates, it investigates the positive potential of 'peace formation', outlining the theoretical development of this new concept as a parallel process and often in opposition to modern state formation with which it is often bound up. It also examines the limits of peace formation and its engagement with old and new types of power and conflict. This perspective on the formation of political order has implications for the international peace architecture and its evolution, including in terms of a shift from analogue to digital form of peace.

Contrary to most debates about state formation, this article outlines an alternative perspective on the shaping of political community – and the international peace architecture – based on the agency of actors engaged in peaceful forms of politics after war. Drawing on long-standing critical debates, it investigates the positive potential of 'peace formation', outlining the theoretical development of this new concept as a parallel process and often in opposition to modern state formation with which it is often bound up. It also examines the limits of peace formation and its engagement with old and new types of power and conflict. This perspective on the formation of political order has implications for the international peace architecture and its evolution, including in terms of a shift from analogue to digital form of peace.

Two major phenomena helped define Japan's foreign relations in the early modern period: the ban on international maritime travel and trading, and the Japanese adaptation of a Sinocentric rhetoric governing foreign relations with tributary states. In this article I will describe and analyze how these phenomena emerged and evolved, with special emphasis on the role they played in shaping Japan as an early modern nation state and forming for it a sense of "national identity." My examination will focus on them especially in the context of Japan's relationship with its East Asian neighbours, and I place particular emphasis on four points.

The problem of a new international order formation is associated with a number of interrelated issues: changing the role of a state in the international arena, strengthening non-state actors in international relations, the impact of globalization on the political, economic and cultural spheres, interdependence and more. The aim of the article is to form a holistic view of the formation of the new international order in the context of global international political transformations, as well as to determine the fundamental difference between the international and world order. The use of a systematic approach makes it possible to study the international order as a set of relations between the main actors of international relations. It is established that the scientific category "international order" should be distinguished from "world order". Given the existence of an institutional framework between states, an international order can exist without a world order. "International order" can move to a qualitatively new state of a "world order" when the process of ordering will involve all international actors without exception.

This article summarizes the territorial and sectoral characteristics of the labor market, which should be taken into account when predicting the need for skilled labor. A procedure for the formation of public order at the regional level has been developed. scientifically-based proposals and recommendations were developed to solve the problem of the interaction of the labor market with the vocational education system, as well as to develop effective professional training in the country on the recommendation of the workforce.

After short slowdown of the US offensive liberal world order formation strategy during the Trump administration, President Biden declared that democrats would pursue offensive strategy of establishing liberal world order. J. Biden's declarations and recommendations prepared by most prestigious think tanks testify to the fact that the United States are ready to start a new decisive great power competition to achieve and consolidate predominance and omnipower status, to stake everything to achieve irreversible results and overplay China and Russia. To fulfill this ambitious task, democrats suggest policy that combines military and diplomatic instruments. The hypothesis is the following: great power competition is not a new phenomenon in world politics, however contemporary stage of international development can be defined as "new multilevel governable competition" when the United States will try to determine/program world development, development and policies of various countries and organizations. One of the important characteristics of contemporary period is not only new quality and greater scale of competition between three great powers. It is also new quality and density of international milieu: medium range and small countries have got more important status and use new conditions for getting privileges maneuvering among US, China, Russia and some other influential players. The primary aim of the American programming strategy is to restrict as much as possible maneuvering space for China and Russia, preventing formation of "Eurasian center", to influence the choice of other countries in favor of the West/US. The international situation seems to be rather favorable for the United States, but the danger of overexertion and overextension in fulfilling ambitious task of global offensive and programming governance remains. The "nerve" of the present situation is whether Russia and China can stand against American policy, neutralize its effect. It is not quite clear how other growing powers and medium range countries will act. Coming decades will be decisive for the formation of contemporary world order.

In the article an "order" is analyzed as a complex and difficult phenomenon, acting as sociocultural code for governmental organization development typical for any social system. Formation of "order" idea, its mythological and rational interpretations, systemized modern approaches to its understanding are traced in this article. In addition, in the content there is an author's interpretation of political legal order appropriate to modern political and legal processes. In this case political and legal order is taken as social phenomenon, based on political, legal norms, ideas, values and ideals, providing stable institutional society organization, that reflects ordering and reproduction of social relations and specific character, patterns of socialcultural system developing of social integrity. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n6s3p198

Formation of order and cognition are interdependent. Knowledge presupposes the observation of order structures or their creation through abstraction and modelling. Contributions from different areas of university research examine structures that relate to (partially) autonomous actors (or agents) and the dynamic processes in which they are developed. Processes of knowledge that take place in this context require structures of order that can be experienced interobjectively, and in some cases can also be grasped in symbolism and rituals, even if these structures are created simultaneously with processes of action or knowledge. Recursive references can lead to forms of self-organization. In more highly developed structures, aspects of knowledge, learning (and forgetting) can be included and additionally strengthened or weakened by emotional states.On November 5, 2005, scientists came together for a workshop on "Formation of Order and Knowledge Processes" at the University of Hamburg. In this volume, numerous of the given talks and articles are collected.

Traditionally, East Asians have tended to hold a strong national, or state-centric, view. In the modern university system established in the Meiji period in Japan, Japanese history was defined as National History, and strictly differentiated from Asian history, as National (i.e. Japanese) literature was differentiated from Chinese literature. Imperial Japan used the theory of expansionism to justify its hegemony in Asia, but that theory collapsed with the close of World War II. Political complications, furthermore, made it difficult for Japanese historians to have contacts with their fellow Asian scholars. Under these circumstances the tradition of National History was reinforced among the academic circle of Japanese historians. Predominant in this version of Japanese history was the image of early modern Japan as a self-contained, "mono-ethnic" state, in "sea-locked isolation", and the Tokugawa bakufu's sakoku (national seclusion) policy was the symbol of that isolation. Internationally renowned studies on Japan's foreign relations by scholars such as Kobata Atsushi and Iwao Seiichi did not attract much attention in Japan.